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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs

I,

.

Case No.
10716

ROY LEE POE,
\
Defend ant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Roy Lee Poe, appeals from his
conviction of M:URDEH IN THE FIRST DEGREE in Yiolation of Section 76-30-3, Utah Code
1\nnotated, 1953, upon jury trial in the Fifth Judicial
District Court of 'Vashington County, State of Utah.
The Honorable C. Nelson Day presided, and the appclla11t was sentenced to be executed.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crime of
murder in the first degree by information filed in the
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 'V ashington County, State of Utah. He was arraigned on
January 14, 1966, and a plea of not guilty was entered.
Trial by jury was commenced on March 28, 196U, and
concluded on April 1, 1966. After presentation of
evidence the appellant was found guilty of murder in
the first degree, and the jury having made no recommendation for mercy, Judge C. Nelson Day enteml
judgment upon the verdict, and sentenced the appellant
to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison. The
appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison
on April 18, 1966, to await execution. On May 10,
1966, Judge Day ordered a stay of execution pending
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that the conviction should
be reversed, and that a new trial be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The following is a summary of the evidence otf ered
at trial. Kenneth Hall was fatally shot twice thro11gh
the head by a firearm, presumably a .22 calibre ri!le
(Tr. 441, 442). The deceased was discovered late in
the afternoon of November 9, 1965, when Lelnrnl Hall,
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bis brother, broke into the deceased's house in St.
(;eorge, Utah (Tr. 328, 329, 331). He was found in
a sleeping position, his arms crossed, one over the other
oil the upper part of his body (Tr. 332). Leland Hall
identified the body as that of his brother, Kenneth
Hall, a long time resident of St. George (Tr. 325,
3i31 ) .

Ou the 10th day of November an investigation and
searci. was conducted of the deceased's house and surrounding premises. Lt. Clarence Evans, Salt Lake
Count:; Sheriff's Office, testified that there were several
tire tracks leading to the house, and that there were
many footprints around the building itself. He further
testified that even though he had the equipment, no
ti11ger prints were taken (Tr. 400, 461). However,
there were numerous photographs taken of the area
around the house, the house, and of the deceased (Tr.
-Hil).

The body was removed from the house and taken
to l'tah \ralley Hospital in Provo, Utah (Tr. 467,
-tU8). There, Dr. 'Vilford Le Cheminant removed two
fragments of metal from the deceased (Tr. 412, 413,
-t H. 437, 438). These pieces of metal were later identified as rifle slugs by Richard J. Poppleton, a special
11gent of the F. B. I. (Tr. 489, 492, 493). He stated
that the two slugs had the same characteristics as some
lnillcts which he tested from a .22 calible rifle that had
b<:en loaned to the deceased and which was State's
('\liibit :!8 (Tr. 491, 492, 493, 495, 496).
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La Var Hall testified that he went to the residenee
of Ken Hall, where the defendant, Roy Poe, was also
living, on the afternoon of November 6, 1965. There
he gave Ken Hall some money, about twenty-fin
dollars, for a freezer (Tr. 513, 514, 516). Later that
same afternoon Roy Poe and Ken Hall went to the
O.K. Tire Store in St. George, Utah (Tr. 683). Eldon
Hafen stated that Ken Hall came into the store alone
to get a tire from him (Tr. 525). Mickey Clark testified that at that time he had a conversation with Roy
Poe outside the tire shop (Tr. 684) . During the conversation Mr. Poe asked to borrow $10 so that he could
visit his relatives in Las Vegas, Nevada (Tr. 685).
Max "Tulfenstein testified that at approximately
9 :30 p.m. November 6, 1965, both Roy Poe an<l Kenneth Hall were in the Sun Bowl Club, St. George,
Utah, but neither saw the other (Tr. 542, 543, 544<).
The witness stated that Ken Hall left the Club about
10:00 p.m. with Irwin Pace (Tr. 545). According to
the witness' testimony Roy Poe, the defendant, left
the Club thirty minutes later (Tr. 546). Although the
witness remembered seeing both Ken Hall and Roy
Poe in his establishment several times before, he could
not remember any of the other times or dates (Tr.
546, 549, 550) . The only reason he could remember
this particular time and date was because "the officers
told him so". (Tr. 550, 551).
Irwin Pace testified that Ken Hall gave him a ride
in his 1957 Plymouth station wagon on Non:·mber fl.
4

He further stated that Ken Hall dropped him
off at IO :25 p.m. that night (Tr. 569, 570, 571, 573).
HHi5.

At 11 :00 p.m. that same evening, Yern Phillips
testified, Roy Poe was in the Sun Bowl Club (Tr. 590).
r\ t that time the defendant, Roy Poe, sold him two
rifles, one of which was a .22 calibre (Ex. 28) (Tr .
.JUO, 1)0~). The witness then proceeded to give two confiidillg statements as to what was said during the transaction (Tr. 600, 608, 609, 610, 611). He stated that
the defendant, although acting calm and normal, told
him that he had killed somebody (Tr. 600). Then
Phillips admitted that he had previously testified at
preliminary hearing that the defendant, acting calm
mid normal, had said nothing other than that about
the sale (Tr. 608, 609, 610, 611).
David Holtz testified that Roy Poe drove a 1957
Plymouth station wagon into his gas station on the
outskirts of St. George, Utah, at 11 :30 p.m., November
li, 1965 (Tr. 616, 617). 'Vhile Holtz filled the car with
gas, he overheard Roy Poe say something about going
to Las Yegas (Tr. 617, 620). Between 1:00 a.m. and
2:00 a.m. November 7, 1965, Mary Miner saw Roy
Puc iu )lesquite, Nevada, at the cafe where she worked
(Tr. 636, 637).
J erol<l Hickey testified that on

November 12,

HIG:3, he arrested Roy Poe in Las Y egas, Nevada (Tr.
1;50).

The following clay the defendant was transferred
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from Las Yegas to St. George, Utah, by Sheriff 'Vhitehead (Tr. 401, 402).
There was substantial evidence that Poe had been
drinking heavily on the night of November 6, Hlu5.
The last witness who testified before the court was
Delton Ray Nance (Tr. 710). He testified that he had
been in the same cell with the defendant after Poe
had been transferred to St. George, Utah (Tr. 711).
The witness then testified to some conversations between Poe and himself in the '\T ashington County .Tail
on November 15, 1965 (Tr. 712, 713, 714, 716). The
witness and Poe were reading some mystery stories
from detective magazines that Nance had bought at the
store for the defendant (Tr. 712, 716). Nance testified that Poe said that if it ever happened again, it
would be worth a lot of money, $50,000 or $60,000
so that he would be able to fight the case (Tr. 71:2,
713). The witness then said that Poe had planned to
go to Old Mexico (Tr. 713, 714). However, on crossexamination the witness stated that the defendant said
he had abandoned the 1957 Plymouth in Las Vegas
(Tr. 723).
Nance further testified that he had been put on
probation in connection with the offense for which
he was being held at the time the defendant was
in jail (Tr. 723, 724). After a brief re-direct exa1nination both counsel indicated that they had no furthn
questions for the witness (Tr. 725). At this time the
Judge commenced to give his own testimon~' as to the
6

credibility of the witness. He testified that Nance was
placed on probation by the same court for which he
,, as now testifying. The Judge also stated that Nance
presumably reported to his probation officer regularly
;:11d complied with any other requirement which had
been set by the court (Tr. 726) . The Judge further
commented that he knew nothing of the connection
between Nance and Roy Poe until the witness gave his
testimony at the trial (Tr. 726).
During the trial the prosecution introduced several
gruesome pictures of the deceased. Some of the exhibits were used to establish the deceased's identity,
his death and the cause of death; the cause of death
was never in dispute. (Tr. 362, 379, 380, 382). Following the introduction of seYeral black and white photographs of the deceased and his home, seven grotesque
l'olor slides of the autopsy of the deceased were admitted into evidence (Tr. 429). These color slides
depicted the head, neck and shoulders of the deceased
after the autopsy had removed a section of his skull
and peeled his skin back over his head, exposing the
brain cavity (Tr. 416, 421, 426). These "shocking" exhibits were displayed to the jury by means of
a slide projector along with a living narration from
the autopsy surgeon, Dr. Le Cheminant (Tr. 436HO). All over the objection of the defense. There
was 110 dispute that the deceased had been shot twice
in the head and died from the wounds. These photographs were unrelated to the cnlpability of the accused
if h"'t1iltv
and were sickening and inflammatory.
•
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FACTS RELATIYE TO THE COl\tlPOSITION
OF JURY
The follownig facts are presented for the purpose
of showing the general composition of the jury, and
more specifically the proximity of the relationships
which existed between the members of the jury and witnesses for the prosecution, the victim, the prosecutors,
and the defendant. Additional facts are presented relative to pre-trial opinions held or expressed by the jurors,
along with any discussons with jurors or other exposure
of the jury to the purported facts of the case.
ACQUAINTED vVITH 'VITNESSES FOR
THE PROSECUTION:
The record reflects that Evan G. Whitehead, Sheriff
of 'Vashington County, was personally known by every
member of the jury (Tr. 154).
The record does not show just which members of
the jury were acquainted with George Andrus, Deputy
Sheriff of Washington County, but when Judge Day
asked how many knew Deputy Andrus, he commented,
"Well, all of you, almost all" (Tr. 155).
Witness Elba Owen Clark was known by five
members of the jury, (Tr. 176, 180, 181, 183, 184),
and witness Irwin Pace was acquainted with six members of the jury (Tr. 203, 205, 206, 209, 210).
Witness Eldon Hafen was acquainted with every
member of the jury (Tr. 211). In addition to knowing
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all of the jurors he was related to two of them (Tr.
211, 213). Juror Snow was a third or fourth cousin
;:o Mr. Hafen (Tr. 213) and Juror Adams was a third
rnusin to Mr. Hafen (Tr. 213). Also, in addition
b .Juror Snow being l\Ir. Hafen's third cousin, the
wives of Juror Snow and Mr. Hafen are sisters (Tr.
211).

\Vitness D. Kline Adams was known by ten of the
twefre jurors (Tr. 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246),
and one of the jurors, Mr. Talbot, was at the time of
the trial, transacting business with Mr. Adams (Tr.
2-1<5).

It is not certain how many jurors were acquainted
with witness Jake Milne (Tr. 249), but it was more
than three (Tr. 247, 24'8, 24'9). One of the jurors, Mr.
\Vehb, 'vas his first cousin (Tr. 247) and the wife of
.Juror Stanworth was also a first cousin to Mr. Milne
(Tr.248).
\Yitness Jay Ence was known by two jurors, (Tr.
250-252) , one of them being Kay Ence, his first cousin
(Tr. 250).
Witness Scott Prisbury was known by two jurors,
~Ir. Stanworth (Tr. 257) and Mr. Thompson (Tr.
253). Both of these jurors were building contractors
aml Mr. Prisbury was a building inspector (Tr. 225,
2;i7). As a result of his job Mr. Prisbury had direct
::11<1 mnstant personal contact with these jurors prior
to the trial (Tr. 255, 257).
9

Several jurors knew witness, Vern Phillips, but
the record does not disclose just how many or which
jurors (Tr. 258).
All of the jurors knew Donald Best, of the Utah
Highway Patrol (Tr. 259) and Juror Adams was a
cousin to the wife of Trooper Best (Tr. 258).
Several of the jurors were acquainted with witness
LeGrande Spillsbury (Tr. 263), and witness Max
Wulffenstein was known by Juror Adams (Tr. 173).
Also, of extreme importance is the fact that many
of the jurors knew the deceased's brother. (See infra
p. IO, II).
ACQUAINTED \VITH DECEASED AND HIS
BROTHER:
Of the twelve members of the jury, six of them
were personally acquainted with the deceased, l\Ir. Ke11
Hall. (Tr. 137, 141, 149, 151, 222). Of these six jurors,
one of them, Mr. Thompson, commented as follows:
"I was a next door neighbor to him for a period
of time that he lived out at the feed store and
I have known him for, oh, 16 years. Some business and just a friendly acquaintance." (Tr.
137).
Mr. Stanworth, another juror, testified of Ken Hall
that: "He was married to my cousin at one time" ('fr.
150).

Leland Hall, who was the brother of Ken Ilall
and also a witness for the prosecution, was knmrn h~

10

either four or five members of the jury (Tr. IG4, Hiti,
1G8, 170, 171). The record of the trial was not exactly
clear on just how many jurors knew him.
AC(-lUAINTED \VITH PROSECUTORS:
The record shows that of the twelve members of
the jury, nine of them were personally acquainted
with ~Ir. Phillip Lang Foremaster, 'Vashington County
Attorney, (Tr. 69, 73, 77, 79, 80, 81, 133), and five of
them were personally acquainted with _Mr. J. Harlan
limns, District Attorney, Fifth Judicial District (Tr.
li9, 7H, 76, 79, 80). Three of these jurors were acquainted with counsel as a result of an attorney-client
relationship (Tr. 69, 77, 80), and one of these three
jurors, l\Ir. Kay Ence, said of l\Ir. Foremaster: "'Vell,
we go to him for our legal work if we have any ... "
(Tr. 77). l\Ir. Ence also said he would be going to Mr.
Foremaster for legal work "within the next, probably,
eouple of weeks . . . " (Tr. 77).

l\Ir. Talbot, another juror, indicated that he and
Ur. Foremaster were neighbors (Tr. 79), and Jurors
Graff and 'Vebb were jurors in another case where _l\Ir.
Hurns was counsel for one of the parties (Tr. 76, 79).
Also, .T uror Snow, had served as a witness for one
of l\lr. Burns' clients in prior litigation (Tr. 73).
AC(~(TAINTED

\VITH DEFENDANT:

The record indieates that +he defendant, Roy Lee
Po<', \\'as eompletely unknown by eyery member of
11

the jury (Tr. 40, 132). In fact, of all the jurors and
potential jurors only one person was acquainted with
Mr. Poe (Tr. 40). Comparing this fact to the general
acquaintanceships which existed among the members
of the community, as expressed by the record in this
case, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Poe was a
virtual stranger to the people of St. George.
PRE-TRIAL OPINIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND
EXPOSURE TO PURPORTED FACTS:
Judge C. Nelson Day noted for the record that
"practically all" of the potential jurors had "read about
or heard about what purported to be the facts of this
matter ... " (Tr. 25).
Judge Day also noted that "several of you have"
formed or expressed an opinion about what purports
to be the facts in this case (Tr. 25). In his subsequent
voir dire of the potential jurors, Judge Day did not
inquire on an individual basis as to each juror's pretrial exposure to the purported facts of the case. He
restricted his interrogation to the question of whether
or not the jurors had formed or expressed an opinion
as to the purported facts.
Out of the twelve jurors who actually served. ten
of them said they had not formed or expressed an opinion (Tr. 26, 28, 31, 36, 37, 40). One juror, l\Ir. Holt,
said, "I've (sic) expressed an opinion when it first happened, but I still think I could go
... " (Tr. :37) ·
The twelfth juror, Mr. Thompson, was not even
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a~,kecl whether or not he had formed or expressed an
opiuion (Tr. 131, start of interrogation).

l, 1\ CTS-COMJHUNITY ATTITUDES AND
P:E.RSONS CALLED FOR JURY SERVICE
St. George is a relatively small town with a population of approximately .5,130 with 'Vashington County
as a whole having a population of approximately
10,271.

Even though Judge Day made an attempt to keep
potential jurors from giving their opinions or discussi11g the crime, the following excerpts from the trial
record will show that a community pattern of thought
had developed as to the facts of this case.
'Vhen Judge Day asked which of the jurors had
read or heard about what purported to be the facts in
the matter before the court, he replied to his own question, "'Vell, I would say practically all of you have"
(Tr. 2.5). He then asked "but have you formed or expressed an opinion about ·what purports to be the facts
in this case, any of you?" To this question he again replied. "'Vell, several of you have. I think the thing to
do is to go down through the list" (Tr. 25).
Out of the 51 veniremen called, 47 of them were
asked if they had formed or expressed an opinion as
to the facts of the case. Out of these 47 veniremen, 12
of them (or 2.5.5S~,) admitted having preconceived
opinions, and of those l?., there were 7 veniremen excust>d because they could not set aside their opinions
13

in rendering an impartial decision (Tr. 27, 28, 31, 33,
35, 37, 67, 108, 124, 128, 224).

The voir dire of potential jurors Cottam and Mathis
brought out additional elements of community thought
on the subject. Mr. Cottam, when asked if he had
formed or expressed an opinion on the facts of the
case said "Nothing more than a casual comment that
most citizens in town ... " (Tr. 39). :Mr. Mathis, in
attempting to express his own uncertainty as to bias
or prejudice said, ''I think I'm in the position of a
lot of others of having discussed this ... " (Tr. 123).
Both of these jurors indicated the presence of community feeling on this subject.
Venireman Leany admitted having an opinion, and
when asked if that opinion would prevent him from
basing his verdict solely upon the evidence, he replied
to the Judge and in the presence of the other jurors,
"'Vell, I'd try to look at it that way; but the other may
influence me. It is bound to, what I have heard" (Tr.
28).
Venireman Beatty said he knew Ken Hall and
that he had formed or expressed an opinion prior to
coming into court. V\Then asked if his opinion woul<l
preclude him from thoroughly and impartially determining the issues in this case, he said to the judge and
in the presence of the potential jurors, "I am afraid it
would. My mind is pretty well made up" ('fr. 35).
Juror 'V oodbury was excused by the court because
of opinions formed or expressed (Tr. 3o).
14

.;)Ir. YVells had formed an opinoin and when asked
if there was any question in his mind as to whether or
uot he could render his verdict without bias or prejudice, he said: "'Vell, I figured he was guilty right
along" (Tr. 109).

lloth .Juror 'Vells and .Mathis were excused when
they admitted that their opinions were such that the
burden would be on the defense to prove that their
opinions were wrong (Tr. 124).
Another indication of the climate of the commullity prejudice was evidenced by the comments of :Mrs.
Reichmann when she said:

"I am not giving an opinion, but my husband
is a doctor and while he was not called to examine
Mr. Hall, I happened in the hospital when the
doctors were discussing it, and I heard all the
assorted details of it." (Tr. 128-129).
l\Irs. Heichmann then went on to say that she had a
wry strong opinion in the case and that she would be
biased and prejudiced (Tr. 129).
During the actual trial there was testimony indicating that Poe was looked upon by the community
as being somewhat of an undesirable person. This was
lirought out on the examination of Elba Owen Clark,
wherein l\lr. Clark, in ref erring to the defendant, said,
""Tell, the fellows that I went with used to call him
Third J\Ian Alcatraz. 'Vhen Pickett's store was broke
in previously to this, we used to tease Roy about doing
it ... " (Tr. 687).
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It is common knowledge that an attorney may be
subjected to undue criticism by defending an accused
in an action which is unpopular within the community.
In this connection, it is important to note that Judge
Day may have been aware of such an attitude when
he made the following statement:

"Mr. lVIorris is not a party to this action,
neither is Mr. Pickett nor neither of the attorneys
representing the State. As a matter of fact, l\Ir.
Pickett and :Mr. Morris are court appointed
counsel. They didn't ask for this assignment, yet
in the high tradition of the members of the :Bar
of the State they willingly and with good grace
assumed the defense of the defendant and thev
are men of great capability in the courtroom.'"
(Tr. 194).
It should also be noted that of the 51 vemremen
called, 37 were asked if they were acquainted with
counsel for the State. Of those 37 there were 32 that
admitted being acquainted in some degree, to either
one or both of the prosecuting attorneys.
As to those veniremen asked about being acquainted
with Ken Hall (the victim) at least 16 stated they
were acquainted with him. Also 12 of the veniremen
were acquainted with Leland Hall, the brother of the
victim and a material witness for the State.
The defendant, however, was known by only one
of the veniremen (Tr. 40), and that venireman was not
on the actual jury, but was eliminated by a pre-emptory
challenge.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJCDICIAL ERROR BY ALLO,VING SHERIFF
E\'AN G. 'VHITEHEAD TO BE SWORN AS
BAILIFF AND TAKE CUSTODY OF THE
JCllY DURING THEIR DELIBERATIONS
Af'TER HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED
AS A 'VITNESS, THEREBY DENYING THE
DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LA'V UNDEH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT XIV.
Just prior to the jury deliberating its verdict,
Sheriff Evan G. Whitehead was sworn in as bailiff
lo take custody of the jury during deliberation (Tr.
765, 766). Sheriff 'Vhitehead was one of the chief witnesses for the prosecution (Tr. 37 4, 403), and was personally acquainted with every member of the jury (Tr.
154<). Because of the relationship of the sheriff to the
jury, as a witness for the prosecution, sheriff, friend
and bailiff, there existed a state of inherent prejudice
of the most extreme kind, and in a comparable case
Supreme Court of the United States found such a
situation sufficient to merit a reversal of a decision
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Turner v. Louisiana,
am U.S . .t.66 ( 1965), which had affirmed a Louisiana
trial court conviction and sentence. State v. Turner,
244. La. -U7, 152 So. 2d 555 (1963). The United States
Supreme Court reversed finding a violation of the due
pro('ess clause of the federal constitution.
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In Turner v. Louisiana, supra, the two principal
witnesses for the prosecution at the trial were also
deputy sheriffs in the county in which the crime was
committed. During the course of the trial the members
of the jury were sequestered in accordance with Louisiana law, and were thereby placed in the custody of the
sheriff. As a result of this custodial relationship the
sheriff's deputies including the two principal witnesses
were in close and continual association with the jurors.
'Vheu the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, State v. Turner, supra, that court
affirmed the conviction of the trial court. In support
of the trial court judgment it said:
"As we have pointed out, under the jurisprudence of this Court unless there is a showing of
prejudice, a conviction will not be set aside
simply because officers who are witnesses in the
case have the jury under their charge. This court
is inclined to look upon the practice with disapproval, however, because in such cases there
may be prejudice of a kind exceedingly difficult
to establish ... " State v. Turner supra, at 557.
The Louisiana Court did recognize that "there
may be prejudice of a kind exceedingly difficult to
establish," but they were unwilling to reverse the trial
court without an actual showing of prejudice.
When this question was presented to the United
States Supreme Court, 1,urner v. Louisio11(/, supro,
that Court was unwilling to go along with the rcq11irement of showing actual prejudice and reversed Ilic
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judgment before it. "Tith respect to the question of
adual or implied prejudice the Court said in Turner
r. Louisiana, supra, at 473:
"And even if it could be assumed that the deputies never did discuss the case directly with any
members of the jury, it would be blinking reality, not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association throughout
the trial between the jurors and these two key
witnesses for the prosecution."
In connection with the issue presented in Turner
v. Louisiana, supra, the Court took occasion to reiterate
its feelings on the basic guarantees of trial by jury as
previously stated in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, at
722:
"In essence, the right to j~iry trial guarantees
to the criminally accused a fair trial by a pane1
of impartial, indifferent jurors. The failure to
accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standard of due process."
The Court then went on to say, at page 473:
"'Vhat happened in this case operated to subvert these basic guarantees of trial by jury."
In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, at 562, the Court
again emphasized the importance of "inherent prejudice" as opposed to "actual prejudice" when it said,
in relation to the Turner v. Lo1tisia11a, decision
"The Supreme Court of Louisiana criticized
the practice but said that in the absence of a
showing of prej nice there was no grounds for
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reversal. 'Ve reversed because the 'extreme prejudice inherent' in the practice required its condemnation on constitutional grounds."
The 'Visconsin Supreme Court has also ruled on
this question as evidenced from the following passage
in Cullen v. State, 26 \Vis. 2d 652, 133 N.W. 2d 284
'
at 285 (1965):
"There are several decisions in this state which
make it clear that the practice of permitting a
prosecution witness to act as jury bailiff is improper even in the absence of proof of actual or
attempted influence upon the jury. State v. Cotter ( 1952) 262 \Vis. 168, 54 N.,V. 2d 43, 41
A.L.R. 2d 222; Surma v. State ( 1952) 260 'Vis.
510, 51 N.\V. 2d 47. See also La Valley v. State
(1925), 188 'Vis. 68, 205 N.\V. 412."
In State v. Cotter, 262 'Vis. 168, 54 N.,V. 2d 43
( 1952), the defendant was convicted of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm. 'Vhile the jury was deliberating its verdict the sheriff, who was appointed
bailiff, was seen going into the jury room, and when
questioned about it he said he merely told the jurors
that it would not hurt his feelings if they hurried.
The \Visconsin Court found this to be sufficient grounds
for reversal, and they remanded for a new trial. In
reversing the court said :
"Even though no prejudice was shown ancl
eyen though the instructions by the trial judge
would tend to eliminate prejudice, if any in f ~ct
existed, a trial must be free not only from pre.1udice, but from the appearance thereof, and the
rule must be adhered to in this case."
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It should also be noted that the sheriff was not even
a witness for the prosecution. The court found sufficient
grounds to reverse merely upon there being an unauthorized communication with the jury.
In what is apparently the Supreme Court's latest
opinion 011 this subject, the Court again recognized the
importance of preventing potential prejudice, when
they stated in Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup. Ct. 486,
at 470 (1966):
"The State suggests that no prejudice was
shown and that no harm could have resulted because 10 members of the jury testified that they
had not heard the bailiff's statements and that
Oregon law permits a verdict of guilty by 10
affirmative votes. This overlooks the fact that the
official character of the bailiff as an officer of the
court as well as the State-beyond question carries great weight with a jury which he had been
shepherding for eight days and nights." (Emphasis added) .
The court reversed a state court conviction.
UTAH POSITION:
In addition to considering the foregoing opinions
by the United States Supreme Court, and other state
Pourts, it is of utmost importance to recognize that this
specific issue has been before the Utah Supreme Court
on several occasions. State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415,
237 Pac. 941 (1925); State v. Crank et al, 105 Utah
332. U2 P. 2d 178 ( 1943). These cases favor the position argued by appellant, and will be discussed in the
above referenced order.
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There also exist two additional Utah cases that
may initially appear to stand contra to appellant's
position, but upon close examination are distinguishable. State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065
(1924). State v. lticNaughton, 92 Utah 99, 58 P. 2d
5 (1936).

In State v. Anderson, supra, the defendant was
convicted of grand larceny in connection with the theft
of certain sheep. The trial lasted approximately three
weeks. After the verdict had been read it was discovered that almost every day during the trial one of
the jurors had ridden back and forth from his home to
the courthouse with one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The witness was one of the persons from whom
the sheep had been stolen.
Based upon the relationship between witness and
juror the court reversed the judgment and remanded
the case to the district court ·with directions to grant
a new trial. In so doing, the court said, at 423:
"But, as we view the record in this case, the
appellant was denied a constitutional right to
be tried and convicted, if convicted, by an impartial jury, as that term is used in the Constitution and is construed by courts."

It is extremely important to note that in State r.
Anderson, supra, the court did NOT require an actual
showing of bias or attempted influence, but based its
decision upon the inherent bias or influence which may
have been present. This point is emphasized in the
following quotations from the court's opm10n:
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"It is true that in this case the juror, as well
as the witness, in their affidavits, affirm that no
reference was made to the case during their trips
back and forth.

"'Ve may absolve the witness Sevy from in
any way attempting to influence the juror by
the courtesy shown him, and likewise concede
that the juror was not consciously affected in
rendering his verdict by the favors which he had
received; but, in our judgment, such conduct
cannot and ought not be a.I>proved, or a verdict
rendered in such circumstances allowed to stand."
In State v. Crank, supra, the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. The relationship between the witness and juror was set out in the
opinion as follows:
"Defendants complaint of misconduct of the
jury, in that Juror Dan Hayes was in conversation with the witness Ashcroft, immediately
prior to the submission of the case to the jur):.
It is stated in the affidavit of Juror Hayes that
he was merely renewing an old friendship with
the witness."
The court then reviewed the probable innocent
nature of the conversation, but then went on to say:
"In spite of these extenuating circumstances,
this conduct is certainly improper, and is to be
condemned bv the Court, PARTICULARLY
IN CAPITAL CASES, where the life or liberty of the defendant is at stake. In such instai-ices, the verdict of the jury, like Caesar's
wife, must be above su.~picion. In the instant
case, since a new trial must be granted on other
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grounds, we need not determine whether such
conduct would alone be grounds for a new trial.
"The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.''
This court's concern with keeping the jury above
suspicion is parallel to the interests of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, as expressed in State v. Cotter, supra,
in keeping the jury free from the appearance of prejudice. Also, the opinions of the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Anderson, supra, and State v. Crank, supra,
are in full agreement with the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, as expressed in Turner v. Louisiana, supra.
In State v. Lanos, supra, the defendant was convicted of forging a check which was presented and
paid by a bank. During the trial one of the jurors said
that he was employed by a company that maintained
its account at the bank. The juror did not maintain his
personal account at the bank, but it was still unclear
whether or not there may have been a debtor-creditor
relationship, apparently resulting from his employer
having an account there. If there had been a debtorcreditor relationship, there would have been grounds
to challenge for cause under Comp. Laws Utah 1917
§ 8954, (§77-30-19(2) U.C.A., 1953), but for such a
challenge to be made "of right" it must have been made
prior to the time that the jury was sworn Comp. Laws
Utah 1917, § 8948 (§77-30-13 UCA, 1953). 'Vhereas,
this relationship was not disclosed until the trial was
in progress, the dismissal of the juror was at the dis-
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cretion of the judge, and the court determined that the
relationship was so remote that the judge did not abuse
his discretion.
The Lanos case can be distinguished from the case
at bar, based upon the remoteness of relationship and
the severity of the sentence. Also, every juror knew
the sheriff. Even in the Lanos case, when the relationship was admitted very remote, the court may have
reversed if the defendant had been sentenced to face
the firing squad as has the appellant in this case. Also
the differences of degree in relationship of the parties
in the Lanos case and the instant case is so extreme
that the two cases cannot be compared. Further the
other many relationships between the various witnesses,
the sheriff, and the jurors make it manifest this case
is substantially more aggravated.
In State v. McNaughton, supra, the court held that
there was not sufficient ground to declare a mistrial
when it was discovered that two of the jurors shook
bands with a witness for the prosecution as they filed
out of the courtroom. There was also evidence that one
of the jurors was indebted to the same witness.
As to the debtor-creditor relationship the court
relied upon its opinion in State v. Lanos, supra.
The McNaughton case can also be distinguished
upon the remoteness of relationship, the extent of inrnlvcmcnt and degree of sentence. In the McN aughton case the defendant was convicted of changing
the brand on six sheep with the intent of stealing them.
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"\Vhereas, the court did not find the handshake or the
debtor-creditor relationship sufficient to declare a mistrial, the inference is that it would have if the defendant's life was at stake, as in fact it is in the case at bar.
Therefore, the Utah precedent on the issue of
whether the challenged conduct was prejudicial in this
case would support reversal. Also, due process
under the Federal Constitution clearly requires reversal
even in the absence of specific prejudice.
The record of the trial did not disclose an actual
attempt by Sheriff "\Vhitehead to use his position of
bailiff to influence the jury, and whereas appellant's
argument is based upon an "inherent prejudice' 'as
opposed to an actual showing of prejudice, respondent
may contend that "inherent prejudice" is insufficient
grounds for reversal. In support of their argument
they may rely upon this court's language in State v.
Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P. 2d 655 (1966),
wherein this court said:
"There should be no dismissal of a charge, nor
reversal of a judgment, unless there was a significant failure or abuse of due process of law,
or unless there was an error or defect which it
could reasonably be supposed put the defendant
at some substantial disadvantage, or had some
substantial prejudicial effect upon his rights."
In reply to this appellant would again reiterate
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Turner v. Louisiana, supra, wherein that court took
the position that an abuse such as was present in the
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rnse at bar would be a violation of the minimal standards of due process under the XIVth Amendment.
Also we \vould refer again to the position of the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, supra, and State
'l'. Crank et al., supra, wherein the court express the
importance of keeping the jury above suspicion. Also
in the Seymour case this Court held that if there were
a reasonable supposition that a defendant would be
put at a disadvantage, reversal would be required.
The Supreme Court of the United States, this court,
an<l the highest courts of other states have found such
a reasonable supposition under like circumstances in
other cases.
A review of Sheriff 'Vhitehead's activities as both
an investigator and witness for the prosecution, plus his
general familiarity with the members of the jury will
show that his appointment as bailiff was prejudicial
error, sufficient to reverse the trial court judgment.
Sheriff 'Vhitehead was known by every member
of the jury (Tr. 154), and was active in community
affairs, as evidenced by his participation iu projects
sponsored by the local Lions Club (Tr. 154). He was
personally acquainted with Mr. Ken Hall (the victim),
and in fact had known Mr. Hall "practically all of my
life". (Tr. 37 4) . The sheriff was not, however, acquainted with the appellant, Mr. Poe. They were in
fact, complete strangers until the 13th of November,
HW5, when Sheriff 'Vhitehead picked Mr. Poe up m
Las Yegas (Tr. 410).
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As Sheriff of 'V ashington County he was in charge
of the entire investigation. He was first to arrive at
the scene of the crime, after it had been discovered by
the victim's brother (Tr. 375). He received from Yer;1
Phillips what is assumed to have been the murder
weapon (Tr. 604). He made a thorough search of the
Hall residence (Tr. 391), witnessing the condition
of the body, the presence of the victim's wallet, expended .22 shells about the outside of the premises,
and the odor which was present throughout the house;
all of the investigatory activities of the sheriff were
part of his testimony.
After a review of the record (Tr. 37 4-409), there
can be no question as to Sheriff 'Vhitehead's prominent
position as investigator and witness.
Sheriff "Thitehead was sworn in as bailiff just
prior to the jury retiring to deliberate its verdict (Tr.
765-766). After the Sheriff was sworn as bailiff, the
Judge dismissed the alternate juror and said, "The
rest of you are in the custody of the Sheriff here ... "
(Tr. 766). He then went on to say "Sheriff, they're all
yours."
The record does not show whether or not the Sheriff
thereafter had an occasion to discuss the case with the
jurors. Nor does the record show that the jurors were
taken out of the court, in the custody of the Sheriff.
for the purpose of having lunch. I-Iowever, the recorrl
does disclose that court was convened at 10 :00 a.m.
on April l, (Tr. 730) that the .JllrY retired at 12 :-1.J
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p.m. (Tr. 766), and that they did not reach a verdict
until 4 :05 p.m. (Tr. 767). Therefore, a reasonable
inference can be drawn that the jurors were in the custody of the sheriff for one meal.
The history of the jury system reveals cases where
the court has found it proper to lock its jurors up without food or water until such time as they have reached
a verdict. This is a sin of which the appellant does not
belien the trial court was guilty. It is in fact very
probable that the jury was either taken out to eat or,
it had lunch brought in to it. In either event the Sheriff
would have had direct contact with the jurors of the
\·ery type which the Supreme Court feared in Turner
t 1• Louisiana, supra.
The Court's primary fear as expressed in Turner
r. Louisiana, supra, was an undermining of the basic
guarantees of trial by jury, resulting from the association between the jurors and two key prosecution
witnesses. in this respect they stated at 474:
"For the relationship was one which could not
but foster the jurors' confidence in those who
were their official guardians during the entire
period of the trial."
As the record of the trial demonstrates, Sheriff
Evan G. 'Vhitehead was in a position to foster the
('011fidence of the jurors. He also had a vast personal
knowledge of the facts surrounding this case. The combination of his personal knowledge of the facts, the
eontidence the Jury obviously had in his personal
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judgment, and his access to the jury as bailiff during
the very critical period of deliberation, are the very
factors which caused the Supreme Court to reverse in
Turner 'L'. Louisiana, supra. It seems inescapable, that
in this case, where the jury returned the maximum
sentence in a case that was not extraordinary, that this
court must reverse.

POINT II
DEFENDANT \VAS DENIED A FAIR
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE COMMUNITY PATTERN OF THOUGHT AS EXPRESSED HY THE POTENTIAL JURORS, AND AS A RESCLT OF THE PROXIMITY OF RELATIONSHIPS \VHICH EXISTED BET\VEEN l\IE~\IBERS OF THE JURY
AND \VITNESSES FOR THE PROSECCTION, THE VICTil\I, THE PROSECUTOHS
AND THE DEFENDANT.
The facts as reflected in the record and as commented on in a preceding section, when examined in
conjunction with the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 ( 1961).
show that under the standards set by that court, the
defendant was denied his rights to a fair trial.
The test established in Irvin V. Dowd, supra, is
not that a juror must be completely void of any preconceived notions, as they felt that would be an impossible standard. The court's opinion was that:
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"It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impressions or opinions and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court." (At.
p. 723).

However, the court went on to say:
"The adoption of such a rule, however, cannot
foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case,
the application of that rule works a deprivation
of the prisoner's life or liberty without due process of law. Lisemba Y. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236. As stated in Reynolds, the test is
'whether the nature and strength of the opinion
formed are such as in law necessarily ... raise
the presumption of partiality'." (At ·page 723).
As to the impartiality of jurors the court recognized that the determination of such a state of mind
was uot an easy determination to make and in this connection they cited Chief Justice Hughes in United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-146 ( 1936), as saymg:
"Impartiality is not a technical conception.
It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of
this mental attitude of appropriate indifference,
the Constitution lays down no particular tests
and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula."
In Irwin v. Dowd, supra, the crime was somewhat
more spectacular. It involved six murders, plus publication in the newspapers that the defendant had confrssed, but as to the points here in question there is
a remarkable similarity between Irvin v. Dowd, and the
instant case. The following factors are comparable
between the cases:
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a) In the Irvin case the trial was held in a small
community (Gibson County-population 30,000). Iu
the case at bar the trial was held in a small community ('Vashington County-population approximately
10,271).

b) In the Irvin case it was noted that the press
attempted to excuse defense counsel for its action in
defending the accused because the attorney would be
disbarred if he didn't. In the case at bar it can be
argued that Judge Day was attempting to exoneratt
defense counsel from its participation in an unpopular
cause, when he commented on them as being court appointed (Tr. 194).
c) In the Irvin case the court excused 268 persons
out of 430, as having fixed opinions as to the guilt of
petitioner. In the case at bar a total of 51 persons were
called as veniremen, and of those 51, 9 were excused
on grounds of being biased or prejudiced. 'Vhile in the
case at bar there was not as large a percentage it would
seem that 17. 7 % is still extreme. Particularly where a
more probing voir dire may have caused more to be
excused.
d) Many of the comments made by the prospectiYe
jurors in Irvin were very similar to comments made
by prospective jurors in this trial, i.e.; "Could not ...
give the defendant the benefit of the doubt that he is
innocent" Irvin v. Dowd, at p. 728. In this case (Tr.
124) the jurors admitted it would be up to the defense
to change their minds. Also in Irvin v. Dowd, at p. 728,
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there was the comment "You can't forget what you
hear and see." Whereas, in this case (Tr. 28) when
askt>d about preconceived opinions affecting his judgment a juror commented "It is bound to, what I have
heard.''
As recognized by the court in Irvin v. Dowd, supra,
it is very questionable that such a thing as "absolute
nnpartiality" does in fact exist, and if such a standard
were strictly required by the courts in selecting a jury
it is possible that a jury would never be seated. Therefore, we examine each prospective juror to determine
whether or not the accused would get a fair hearing
based upon that juror's response to the various questions asked of him, and if he responds satisfactorlly
he cannot be challenged for cause. This does not mean
that that juror does not contain some hidden or subconscious bias or prejudice. Such a state of subdued
bias or prejudice may not really be too harmful to
au accused if it is only present in one or two jurors,
or if possibly off-set by similar bias or prejudice
of other jurors in favor of the accused. However, if
there is reasonable grounds to believe that there is a
state of subdued bias and prejudice in all or most of
the jurors such bias and prejudice may come to the
surface when the members of the jury collectively begin
their deliberation.
In the rather exact field of mathematics it may
he true that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts,
hut in the subjective field of human nature that equa-
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tion may not be true, and the collective action of the
group may certainly exceed the action which may han
been taken by any individual member of that group.
Admittedlv
in small towns there is alwa''S
.J
:r b'"Oill"
C1
to be a problem of selecting a jury that is completely
unfamiliar with the parties, counsel and witnesses,
and as a practical matter it might be impossible
But when the inter-relationships between the jurors
and the parties, witnesses and counsel are as pronounced as they are in the case at bar, involving frien<ls.
neighbors and close relatives, it seems highly unlikely
that those relationships would not have a pronounced
effect on the deliberations of the jury.
In connection with this community inter-relationship, it is of the utmost importance to recognize hrn
additional facts. First, the appellant was a relatiye
stranger to St. George, so the community feelings
which existed were in opposition to him. Second, it must
be recognized that the appellant was on trial for his
life, and where it may be deemed a necessary expe<lic11t
to allow small town juries to decide local controwrsie~
between local citizens, we should not allow a yirtu:1l
stranger to be tried for his life in a community when
the person killed was a life-time resident of that community and where the prospective jurors expressed
prejudice and unwillingness to accord the accuse<l the
basic protections of due process of law.
In a recent New Jersey case, State v . .Jacl.·snn, J:J
N.J. HS, 203 A 2d l, ( 19G4), that l'.ourt reversed and
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remanded for new trial a first degree murder conyid10n. The court found error committed by the trial
court when it refused to dismiss a juror who had been
challenged for cause. The cause for dismissal, as argued
by defense counsel, was that the juror could not be considered fair and impartial because he was a close friend
of a detective who was a witness for the prosecution.
In support of its decision the court discussed several
other cases where the impartiality of jurors was in question. One of the cases discussed was U.S. v. Chapman,
158 F. 2d 417 (IO Cir.1946), wherein that court said:
"A juror's answer to questions touching his
state of mind is primary evidence of his competency but the ultimate question is a judicial one
for the court to decide, and in case of doubt,
justice demands that the challenge be allowed
.... Only by a punctilious regard for a suspicion
of prejudice can we hope to maintain the high
traditions of our jury system. 'Ve must make
sure that the lamentations of the unsuccessful
litigant is without foundation, either in fact or
circumstances." 1.58 F. 2d at p. 421.
The New Jersey Court also stated:
"The jurors must be carefu1ly selected with
an eye towards their ability to determine the controyerted issue fairly and impartially; in the
words of Justice Blandin in State v. 'Vhite, 105
N.H. 159, 196 A 2d. 33, 34 (1963), the trial
court should see to it that the jury is as nearly
impartial 'as the lot of humanity will admit'."
In reading the opinion of the New Jersey court,
and the related cases upon which that court relied, it
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is evident that the primary concern of the judges
was that it is absolutely necessary to keep the jury
above suspicion by keeping it free from the appearance of prejudice. This very fundamental concept
of having a jury free from suspicion is a concept whid1
the Utah Supreme Court has given its full support.
State v. Crank, supra. This case has already been discussed in connection with Point I of appellant's brief,
and in this connection we refer back to the quotation
from that case which was set out at page 23 infra. Li
State v. Crank, this court was concerned with the potential danger which may have arisen out of a conversation
known to have taken place between a witness and one
juror. In this case we are concerned about the potential
danger which arose because most of the jurors were
friends, relatives or acquaintances of the witnesses,
the prosecuting attorneys and the victim. The problems are essentially the same and the opinion of this
court in State v. Crank, snpra, should demand that
this case should be remanded for a new trial.

POINT Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADl\IITTING INTO EYIDENCE GRUESOl\IE AND GORY COLORED
PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES OF THE AUTOPSY PERFORNIED ON THE DECEASED
'VHEN THE INFLAMl\IA'l'ORY N ATVHE
AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH
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1

PHOTOGRAPHS OVER-SHADOWED ANY
POSSIBLE PROBATIVE VALUE WITH RESPECT TO A FACT IN ISSUE.
Y\Then photographs and color autopsy slides are
offered into evidence for a demonstration to the jury,
their admissibility depends upon whether they are releyant and probative with respect to a fact in issue, and
1d1ether that probative value outweighs the danger
of prejudice to the defendant. Oxidine v. State, 335
P. 2d 940 (Okla. 1958) ; People v. Burm, 109 C.A.
2d 524, 241 P. 2d 308 (1952); People v. Redston, 139
C.A. 2d 485, 293 P. 2d 880 (1956); State v. Russell,
IOG Utah ll6, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), reversing a murder conviction on other grounds.
"The general rule is that, 'Where the inevitable effect of introducing a photograph is to
arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury,
and the fact in proof of which it is offered is
not denied, or where the introduction serves no
purpose other than to inflame the jurors' emotions, it is not admissible'." People v. Redston,
supra, at 883, 884.
If the probative value of photo slides with respect
to a fact in issue outweighs the danger of prejudice
against the defendant, then they are admissible. People
v. Harrison, 30 Cal. Rptr, 841, 381 P. 2d 665, 668
(1963).

It is initially within the sound discretion of the
t ria I eourt to apply these tests to determine whether
the inflammatory nature of the slides is outweighed
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by their probative value with respect to a fact in issue.
People v. Burns, supra; People v. "flarirson, supra.
However, it is an
autopsy pictures of an
dence when there is no
cause of death. O.cidine

abuse of discretion to allow
iufiammatory nature into eYiissue or controversy as to the
v. State, supra.

In People v. Burns, supra, at pages 318, 319, a

murder trial, three photographs of the deceased were
admitted into evidence. They were pictures of the
face, neck and torso taken after the autopsy. They
showed the deceased with his head shaved and with
several surgical cuts and incisions which had been made
for the autopsy. They were offered to depict the i11juries which were inflicted. But no one ever disputed
that the deceased received them. The court could nut
see how the pictures could be used for any purpose
other than to influence the jurors' emotions against the
defendant. The court went on to hold that:
" ... there is a dividing line between admitting
a photograph which is of some help to the jury
in solving the facts of the case and one which is
of no value other than to inflame the minds of the
jurors. This line was crossed in this case." Id. at
319.

In reversing and remanding a manslaughter conviction the court in People v. Rerlston, supra, on pages
888, 889, held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow
pictures taken during an autopsy to be aclmitted in
the trial court. The first photograph complained of
was of the deceased "showing certain incision 011 the
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head ... apparently made during the autopsy." The
second "was a picture of the upper part of the skull,
after the same had been removed with an electric saw,"
and the third picture was of the "base of the skull after
top had been sawed off and removed."
The court recognized that admission of these photographs was within the sound discretion of the trial
court. But there was never any question as to the
identity of the deceased and there was no question as
to the death. Thus, there was no purpose served by
the admission of the photographs other than to inflame
the jurors' emotions. Therefore, the discretion of the
trial court was held to have been abused when it admitted them. The fact that the defense counsel's
objection, after the court admitted the photographs,
was on the ground that they speak for themselves did
not waive the error.
In the instant case, seven gruesome color slides
were introduced at the trial in addition to many other
black and white photos of the deceased. These exhibits
were displayed through a slide projector to the jury.
They could have aroused the jury's passion against the
defendant. State's exhibit No. 19 is a picture of the
face, neck and shoulders of the deceased before the
doctor cleaned the blood from his face. Other black
and white photos showing the position and wounds of
the deceased when found by his brother had already
been introduced.
A second slide, State's exhibit No. 25, depicted the
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deceased's head in a slightly elevated position. It is
a gruesome showing of the base of the skull after the
skull cap and brain were renrn1·ed by the pathologist.
The skin is peeled over the edge of the skull showing
the empty brain cavity. A third exhibit, No. 2-1!,
is a top Yiew of the "inner aspect of the cranial cavity''
(Tr. 439). The scalp is refiected over the head of the
deceased. The top of the skull and brain are removed
exposing the empty cavity. Four other gruesome slides
of the autopsy were also displayed.
The showing of each of these slides was accompanied
by a narrative from the pathologist who performed the
autopsy. The essence of his testimony was that the deceased was shot twice in the head. There was never any
question of the deceased's death or its cause. No one
questioned the identity of the deceased. Thus, there was
no fact in issue that these pictures would help the jury
solve. They only display the handiwork of the autopsy
pathologist.
They were certainly of an inflammatory nature
and thus prejudicial. "Then the slides are examined
as to their probative value the latter is negligible or
non-existent; and, it is overshadowed by the prejudicial effect they would have on the jurors' emotions.
Therefore, even though the trial court had the discretion
to determine their admissibilty when it applied the test
to these photographs, it abused that discretion and
committed a prejudicial error to the defendant. Certainly, in a case where the jury had the opportunity to
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rccoinmend leniency in order to avoid the death penalty,
pidures of the nature introduced in exhibits 19-25,
!iaYiug no relevance to matters not otherwise proved,
could only have inflamed the jury. Defense counsel
objected to their admission (Tr. 429), but still the
court allowed them to be viewed by the jury. Such
action was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial.
Numerous courts have so ruled in comparable cases and
reversed convictions.
In People v. Burns, supra, the court reversed a
murder conviction because the defendant was denied
a fair trial. The autopsy photographs were held to have
been introduced only to influence the emotions of the
jury against the defendant. People v. Redston, supra,
a murder conviction was reversed because the photographs of the autopsy had no value other than to intlame the minds of the jurors. Thus, it was an abuse
of discretion for the trial judge to admit them.
In 0.ridine v. State, supra, the court reversed and
remanded a murder conviction for a new trial. The
eourt held that where there was no issue or controversy
as to the cause of death, which was due to certain bullet
wounds, nor was there any controversy as to the location of the wounds, showing of colored slides on a
screen to the jury taken during the autopsy was prejudicial error since they were a mere appeal to the emotions and passions of the jury.
This court should reverse.
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POINT IY
THE TRIAL COURT C01-\L\UTTED PUE.JUDICIAL EHROR BY CO,\l.i'.IENTING OX
THE CREDIBILITY OI,-. A PROSECCTIOX
"YVITNESS IN SUCH i\ l\IANNER 1\S TO
BOLSTER HIS TESTil\IONY BEFORE THE
JURY.
This court has enumerated the general rule that:
"In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not
permitted to comment on the evidence. It is the
sole awl exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether
the evidence is weak or strong, is in conflict or
is not controverted." State v. Green, 78 Utah
580, 6 P. 2d 177, 181 (rnBl); accord, State Y.
Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P. 2d 284 (1953).
Although a judge may ask proper and pertinent
questions, there is no rule which allows him to intimate
his opinion as to the credibility of any witness. Brennin
v. State, 375 P. 2d 276 (Okla. Cr. 1962) ; State v.
Harris, supra :
"In the minds of the jurors it places the judge
in a hostile attitude toward the defendant and
discredits any defense that he might offer . . . .
No judge ha~ the right ... to indicate his opinion
as to the credibility of any witness examined."
Brennin v. State, supra at page 280.

If the trial judge comments on the credibility of
any witness, it is prejudicial error which requires a
reversal. People v. Frank, 71 Cal. App. 575, 23ti Pac.
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189 ( 1925) ; People v. Ramirez, 113 Cal. App. 2d 842,
2.J.9 P.2d 307 ( 1952) ; State v. Green, supra.

in the instant case, defense counsel during crossexamination of the last of the State's witnesses, Delton
ll.ay Nance, asked if he had ever been placed on probation. The court answered in the affirmative (Tr. 723,
72.J.). Then the witness indicated that he was placed on
probation the preceding December (Tr. 724). The
proseeution then conducted a brief redirect examination
(Tr. 724) . After both defense counsel and the prosecution indicated that they had nothing further to ask the
witness, the court then commenced to vouch for the
yeracity of Nance, as well as add remarks to the record
which were exclusively from his own knowledge (Tr.
726):

"I am the judge who placed Mr. Nance on
probation, and I placed him on probation I don't
remember when but some months ago under the
supervision and direction of the Adult Probation and Parole Department of the State of
Utah. Mr. Alan Keller is the agent of that
office ... I know Mr. Keller requires probationers to report to the Sheriff's Office ... and have
them co-sign their monthly reports each month;
and I assume while Mr. Nance was in 'Vashington County he reported to the Sheriff's office
here for that purpose (Tr. 726) . "
These unsolicited comments certainly would create
an impression, in the minds of the jury, as to the judge's
opinion of the credibility of the witness. Since it is in
t!ic f'xel11sive province of the .iury to determine such
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credibility, the trial judge usurped their function. The
comment was crucial because Nance was a "j ailhouse .,
witness who supposedly heard appellant make what
could be considered an admission of the crime. lleiurr0
a jailbird, Nance's credibility was in doubt and the
judge's comments bolstered Nance's credibility. Thm
the comments were clearly prejudicial in this case. I
People v. Frank, supra; State v. Green, supra.
:
Even when the "trial judge unintentionally in<licates that the witness is worthy of belief," it is error.
Koontz v. State, 10 Okla. 553, 139 Pac. 842, 845 ( 19H); ·
People v. Franli:, supra.
1

"Under our system of criminal jurisprudence, i
the jury are the exclusive judges of the weight
and credibility to be given the testimony of a
witness.
"The courts cannot legally indicate their opinion either expressly or impliedly, intentionally
or otherwise, as to the credibility of any witness
... [T)he whole matter ... must be left to the
jury." Holcomb v. State, 950 Ok. Cr. 55, 239

P. 2d 806, 810, 811 ( 1952).

Thus, it is not the intent of the trial judge that is
controlling. The primary factor is to determine what the
effect of the comments will likely be on the jury. If the
effect of the comments was to prejudice defendant's
case in the eyes of the jury, he cannot be said to ha Ye
had a fair trial. PeoJJle t'. lluff, 134 Cal. App. 2d 187.
285 P.2d 17, 20 ( 1955).
In People

1'.

Ramire::.:, supra, the court reversed
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a narcotics emwiction because the trial judge commented
on the credibility of a state's witness:
"[The judge] should not express an opm10n
as to the credibility of a witness . . . for the
jury are the sole judges of the facts, and the
credibility of witnesses." People v. Ramirez,
supra at page 315; accord, State v. Green, supra.

1

This court indicated that if the trial judge volunteered information about a prior proceeding before him
in which the defendant had a substantial connection, it
would he grounds for a mistrial. State v. Musser, no
Utah 534, 17 5 P .2d 724, 738 ( 1946). In the instant case,
the trial judge stated that the witness had been before
him in a prior proceeding (Tr. 726), and then he volunteered a detailed account of the disposition of that earlier
case; and gave his own version of what he assumed the
witness had done subsequently (Tr. 726). This conduct
could definitely create an impression on the jurors that
the judge felt that Mr. Nance's testimony was worthy
of belief. See Koontz v. State, supra. The trial judge,
by stating he placed the witness on probation, lends
support for the conclusion that the judge thought he
was a good probation risk and therefore a reasonably
credible person. Thus the effect of the judge's testimony
was to strengthen the prosecution's case in the minds of
the jurors. People v. Frank, supra; State v. Green,
supra. The judgment of the lower court should be reW'l"sed and defendant granted a new trial, State v.
u,.een' supra.

45

POINT V
THE CUl\IULATIVE EFFECT OF THE
FOREGOING EHRORS DEPIU\'ED THE APPELL.A.KT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
Each of the foregoing issues presents suff icie11t
ground upon which this court could reverse the trial
court judgment and grant the appellant a new trial.
However, should the court hold against the appellant on
each of these issues there is a self-imposed duty upon
this court to "scrutinize with care the propriety of all
aspects of the proceeding." State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2<l
230, 243, 282 P.2d 323 ( 1955).
It has been recognized by this court that there may
be several errors in a trial, and each error stauding
alone will not be sufficiently prejudicial to merit a
reversal, but when each error is viewed in conj unction I
with the other errors the cumulative effect may amount
to the denial of a fair trial. State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah
444, 454, 121 Pac. 903 ( 1942). This position was reaffirmed in a relatively recent opinion of this court in
State v. St. Clair, supra at 243:
"It is recognized that a combination of errors
which, when singly considered might be thought
insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in their
cumulative effect do so. 1'his is particularl.11 so
where any difference in the verdict, even a recom11Zendation of leniency, would make the diff crence between life and death to the nccused."
(Emphasis added) .
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In light of the above, a brief review of the record
\\'ill show the alleged errors when examined as to their
cumtilative effect prevented the appellant from receiving
a fair trial.

The crime was committed in a relatively small rural
community, and the nature of the crime was such as to
create a great deal of community interest. Needless to
say, the crime of murder is not an everyday occurrence
in a town the size of St. George. In addition to a being
a spectacular crime in a small community, the victim
of the crime was a life time resident of that community.
:'.\Ir. Hall was known by almost everyone who had anything to do with the trial, whereas the defendant was
known by very few people in St. George. The defendant
haJ. only been in the town for a few months, and apparently had no friends that were willing to testify on his
' behalf or to assist him in any way.
There had developed a community attitude about
Mr. Poe both prior to the crime and between the crime
and the trial. One of the most revealing factors as to
the community attitude was reflected in the severity of
the sentence. A close examination of the trial record
will show that the verdict of guilty was based solely
upon circumstantial evidence. The state did not prove
the rifle in question was the murder weapon, they did
not prove the money spent by Mr. Poe for gas was taken
from l\Ir. Hall's wallet, they did not prove with any
certainty the time of death. Admittedly there was cir1·11mstantial evidence upon which the jurors could draw
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inferences, but there was also a lack of absolute proof.
The crime was not unusual as murders go. Under these
circumstances the failure of the jury to make a recommendation of leniency is certainly evidence of the prejudicial impact of the factors argued in this brief on tlie
Jurors.

j
1

I

I

The inter-relationships that existed among the
1
jurors as friends, neighbors and relatives could give rise
to a multitude of unforeseeable consequences. "rheu
such a group of people are allowed to determine the life
or death of a stranger to their community the utmost'
of care should be taken. llut when these jurors, most:
of whom were personally acquainted with the victim.
were allowed to view the color pictures of the autopsy. I
when those pictures could serve no purpose other than
to incite the emotions of a group of people who were
already emotionally involved, any changes of a fair trial
were at that point eliminated.
1

The additional factor of allowing Sheriff 'Vhitchead to act as bailiff, was just one more step in the
process of erroneously allowing an intermingling of
members of the community to the detriment of the
defendant.
From a community standpoint the defendant had
all the cards stacked against him. He did not even hare
the advantage of making a respectable physical appearance during the trial. His appearing in levis, boots. a
plaid shirt and a beard could not possibly have be11efited him.
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It is submitted, therefore that under the rule of

the St. Clair case this court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
Attorney for Appellant
Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services
431 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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